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This paper considers the prospects for financing a wave of new nuclear 
power plants (NPP) using project financing, which is used widely in large 
capital intensive infrastructure investments, including the power and gas 
sectors, but has not previously been used for nuclear power. It argues 
that the first few NPPs will have to be financed on balance sheet by 
large corporations because these plants need to build a positive record 
on construction risk. If that record can be built there is no reason in 
principle why large scale project financing should be denied to NPPs. 
The projects will probably need to have a long term power offtake 
project, requiring a creditworthy electricity supplier, but this is feasible 
even in liberalised but relatively oligopolistic power markets like the UK. 
Interviews with practitioners in the project finance sector confirm that 
banks are interested, in principle, in lending for nuclear power stations. 
Project finance would also readily allow multiple shareholdings in 
individual plants. This in turn would provide the means for power 
companies to diversify their plant risk and for third party financial 
shareholders to invest in diversified portfolios.  This last feature could 
open up a new route for significant equity investment in NPPs. The 
analysis concentrates on the UK but is potentially of wider application. 
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1. Introduction 
Plans for new NPPs have been growing since the early 2000s in response to the 
problem of de-carbonising electricity supply and the improving economics of nuclear 
power against high hydrocarbon prices. Public policy has become more supportive of 
NPPs, especially in the US and UK. The US Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided for 
federal loan guarantees for various energy technologies as well as a degree of 
insurance and production tax credits for the first six GW of nuclear plant capacity 
(Department of Energy 2005 SEC.1306 and 1703). The UK government White Paper 
of January 2008 sees nuclear as having “a key role to play as part of the UK’s energy 
mix” (BERR 2008 p.4). This policy was reaffirmed in the Annual Energy Statement 
by the new coalition government in June 2010 (Department of Energy and Climate 
Change 2010). The Japanese nuclear power disaster in early 2011 doesn’t seem to 
have changed US government policy (Platts 2011) but has led private utility NRG to 
drop plans for two new nuclear stations in Texas (NRG Energy Inc 2011). One 
scenario for a “nuclear renaissance” could see the wave of ageing reactors replaced by 
new stations to maintain the relative share of nuclear in the generation mix. But it is 
possible that nuclear will increase its relative share as it replaces coal and even some 
gas plants, if it can be made economic. 
 
These potential NPP investments are some years away and invite technical, political 
and social challenges, not least in the choice of sites and arrangements for spent fuel 
storage and disposal. But there is also a financing challenge; NPPs are highly capital 
intensive and a rapid phase of new build would require substantial financial resources. 
At a time when there is a large demand for capital for other sorts of infrastructure 
investment, both in developed and emerging economies, nuclear build will need to be 
both economically viable and to use the full variety of commercial financing 
mechanisms if it is to be built. 
 
The UK had about 10.9GW of nuclear capacity in 2010, scheduled to fall to 9.4GW 
by 2015 (National Grid 2010). The UK government used a construction cost central 
case of £1,250/kW for new nuclear (BERR 2008). But more recent cost estimates 
suggest an overnight cost figure of $4,000/kW in 2007 dollars (Du and Parsons 2009), 
which is about £2,600/kW at late 2010 exchange rates. So if all of this plant were 
replaced with new nuclear, the rough order of capital needed would be £28billion 
($43.5bn) excluding the cost of interest. A programme of new build that significantly 
increased nuclear’s market share of generation would cost far more. 
 
Europe’s largest nuclear generator and largest electricity company is EDF. EDF 
started the construction of a new EPR (European Pressurised Water Reactor) at 
Flamanville in late 2007, with a projected total cost (including EPR development 
costs) of Euro 3.3bn (EDF 2008). In July 2010 EDF re-estimated costs at Euro 5bn 
($6.5bn)2, or about € 3,125/kW ($4,031). At the end of 2009 EDF had total book 
equity (including minority interests) of Euro 32.7bn and net debt (total debt and 
financial liabilities, net of cash and liquid securities) of Euro 42.5bn (EDF 2009 
section 39.3). Adding a single EPR with a value around Euro 5bn is therefore a 
material investment relative to the total group balance sheet. A programme of say four 
                                                 
2 Exchange rate €1 =$1.29 
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EPRs in the UK would amount to a very significant investment for EDF and would 
almost certainly require additional equity capital.  
 
Given that EDF is the largest potential European nuclear investor and one of the 
largest in the world, at least in the private sector, it is unlikely that a nuclear 
renaissance in the UK, let alone in other European countries, could be financed by the 
existing electricity companies using their own balance sheets, without substantial new 
equity capital. Shareholders might be willing to put up the new equity but traditional 
utility investors typically seek a steady return from their shares, rather wishing to put 
cash in. They might also see the new investment as being large and potentially too 
risky in relation to the existing assets. 
 
Instead these companies – and possibly new entrants to the sector – will probably 
want to make use of a well established alternative source of funding for large, capital 
intensive investments, which is project finance. This is a way of raising external debt 
and equity against the project investment itself, not the company sponsoring the 
investment. The main advantage of project finance is that it efficiently allocates risk 
among project participants, reducing the required return and allowing more debt to be 
raised. This paper explains what project finance is, how it could be used in the nuclear 
power sector and the problems in using project finance in the early stages of nuclear 
new build. It argues that there is no reason in principle why project finance cannot be 
used to fund nuclear power plants and that there are advantages to its use, including 
the ease with which multiple investors can be included. 
 
2. Corporate finance and project finance 
The normal source of financing for private sector investments is general corporate 
finance, also known as “on-balance sheet” finance. For most companies this is the 
only sort of finance available and consists of borrowing or raising equity against the 
assets of the company as a whole. A bank or bond holder which provides funds to the 
company has a claim against the company’s whole cashflows, unless the loan is 
secured against a particular asset, as is common for mortgages. 
 
So if a company builds a new power station using general corporate finance, the risk 
of that investment is borne by all providers of capital to that company. The only 
limitations for the company arise if there are covenants (legally binding contractual 
clauses) which limit the company from making particular types of investment or from 
exceeding certain financial performance ratios such as debt to equity or interest cover. 
 
A second form of financing that may be available under some circumstances is project 
financing. Project financing is “financing the development or exploitation of a right, 
natural resource or other asset where the bulk of the financing is not to be provided by 
any form of share capital and is to be repaid principally out of the revenues produced 
by the project in question” (Vinter 1998 p.xxxi). (Esty 2004) defines project finance 
as involving “the creation of a legally independent project company financed with 
equity from one or more sponsoring firms and non-recourse debt for the purpose of 
investing in a capital asset”. 
 
The key feature of project financing is that a new company (known as a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) or special purpose entity (SPE)), which we’ll call the project 
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company, is set up solely for the purpose of owning the project to be built. A bank or 
consortium of banks then lends to this project company, which in turn owns the asset, 
which we will assume is a power station. The company that wants to build the power 
station, which we’ll call the sponsor, has a stake in the project company. This stake 
could be 100% but equally there could be other equity partners, which might include 
the company which will build the power station, and other interested parties, 
including external passive investors. 
 
As the loans are made to the project company, not the sponsor company wanting to 
build the station, they are said to be “non-recourse” to the sponsor. So in the event 
that the project gets into trouble and is unable to generate revenues sufficient to cover 
the debt servicing costs, the banks may not pursue the parent company for the cash; 
the parent’s liability is limited to its equity investment stake in the project company. 
In legal terms the project company is “bankruptcy remote” from the sponsor. Pure 
non-recourse is not always feasible but the goal of project financing is to keep the risk 
of lender recourse to the sponsor company as low as possible. Equivalently, project 
financing provides the project sponsor with a put option (or “walk-away option” as 
described by BP-Amoco, (Esty and Kane 2010 p.8). 
 
Project financing provides access to a large pool of debt financing, from banks and 
from bond holders, and enables an electricity company to consider building more 
power stations than it might be able to finance through its normal corporate financing. 
The extra complexity and transactions costs of arranging project finance, including 
very detailed contracts, make it more expensive than normal corporate finance, but the 
benefits include: 
 
1. reduced risk for the parent/sponsor company 
2. better allocation of risks between the owners, constructors, operators and 
suppliers 
3. the possibility of multiple equity investors. 
 
Note that it is possible to have multiple equity investors without project financing but 
the typical project finance structure makes it easier for regular changes of ownership, 
allowing a more liquid secondary market for bonds and potentially equity investors. 
 
The economic benefits from project finance arise from the contractual structure. 
Following (Modigliani and Miller 1958), leverage alone is of no benefit. There may 
be some value in higher tax shields arising from a higher level of debt, but in the BP 
case the company takes a fully consolidated view of its borrowings so project finance 
displaces other forms of corporate debt for no net impact (Esty and Kane 2010 p.8).  
 
Project finance, by separating the risks of the project from those of the sponsoring 
company, has the potential to improve overall risk allocation. (John and John 1991) 
argue that the optimal allocation of debt between the sponsoring company and the 
project results in lower agency costs and a higher tax shield compared with 
conventional corporate finance (p.51). 
 
(Shah and Thakor 1987) show that project financing can increase the value of some, 
typically risky projects and allow greater leverage. The benefit comes from the 
improved ability of creditors to appraise the project they are lending to compared with 
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the situation where they have to appraise the whole firm, of which the project 
cashflows are just one part. The key is reducing the asymmetry of information 
between managers and lenders. 
 
Project finance also appears to overcome the risk of underinvestment that would 
otherwise arise from the danger of financial distress in very large projects. (Esty 
2003) argues that imperfections in capital markets caused by asymmetric information 
and imperfect management incentives mean that large investments might not be 
undertaken, even by very large companies, but for project finance. 
 
(Esty and Kane 2010) provide a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits of project 
finance as seen by BP. Project finance is typically more expensive because it involves 
additional bank fees and third party consultancy and legal fees. These can amount to 
200-300 basis points (bps) as upfront costs and an additional 150-200 bps on the 
annual interest rate. But, in some cases, this is more than offset by the value of 
protecting the company from exceptionally large risks and facilitating the 
involvement of outside partners (Esty and Kane 2010 p.6-8). 
 
(Kleimeier and Megginson 2000) study a large sample of project and corporate 
syndicated loans. They find that "the project financing structure reduces important 
agency costs that are inherent in the creditor/borrower relationship, and that PF is a 
very effective method of providing monitoring for large projects with relatively 
transparent cashflows" (p.87). 
 
3. Some data on project finance deals 
Table 1 shows some recent large project financing examples, illustrating the 
debt/equity financing and the sectors that are attracting substantial financing. 
 
Table 1. Examples of Major Project Financings 2007-2010 ($bn)  
Location Project Year Debt Lenders Sponsor(s) 
Fujairah 
F2 , Abu 
Dhabi 
Power plant & 
desalination 
plant 
2007 2.8 Calyon, Citigroup, SMBC Abu Dhabi Water & 
Electricity Authority, 
International Power, 
Marubeni 
Sakhalin 
II, Russia 
Liquefied 
natural gas & oil 
development 
2008 5.3 Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation + commercial banks 
Gazprom, Royal 
Dutch/Shell, Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi 
Exeltium Virtual power 
project 
2009 2.2 BNP Paribas, Societe 
Generale, Natixis and Credit 
Agricole 
Various energy-intensive 
manufacturing companies 
in France 
PNG 
LNG 
Liquefied 
natural gas
2009 4.5 Exxon Mobil and commercial 
banks
Exxon Mobil, Oil Search, 
PNG Govt & others 
Nord 
Stream 
Gas pipeline 2010 5.0 
(1)
BBVA, Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi UFJ + 24 others
Gazprom, BASF, E.On, 
Gasunie,  
Jubail, 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Oil refining & 
petrochemical 
plant 
2010 8.5 Credit Agricole, Société 
Générale, KfW - IPEX Bank 
& several others 
Saudi Aramco, Total 
Sources: Company websites and press releases; (1) Phase 1 - total project €13.9bn ($17.9bn) 
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Note that many of these “large” projects are around the same size as a single NPP 
(with the exception of Jubail in Saudi Arabia). 
 
The total volume of project financing in 2010 was $207 billion, up from $143 billion 
in 2009 (Thomson Reuters 2010). The largest sectors were power, oil and gas, 
transport and leisure and property (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Global Project Finance in 2010 by Sector (%) 
74
2651
13
14
29
Power Oil & gas Transport Telecoms Leisure & property Other
 
Source: Thomson Reuters (2010) 
 
The ten largest project financings to close in 2010 are shown in table 2. The relatively 
high share of transportation in the totals for the year is explained by the combination 
of the Taiwan High Speed Rail deal and the privatization by the UK government of 
High Speed Rail 1. 
 
Table 2. Largest Project Finance Deals of 2010 
Borrower Domicile $bn
Taiwan High Speed Rail Taiwan 12
Jubail Petrochemical Saudi Arabia 5.8
Nord Stream (gas pipeline) Switzerland 5.4
Hongsa Power Laos 2.9
Perenco Petroleum UK 2.8
KSK Mahanadi Power India 2.7
HSBC Rail acquisition UK 2.7
Exeltium Virtual Power Station France 2.5
High Speed 1 Rail Sale UK 2.2
Coastal Andhra Power India 2.1  
Source: Thomson Reuters (2010) 
4. The practicalities of project finance 
An idealised project finance investment is shown in figure 2. This example is based 
closely on the use of project financing in the wave of new combined cycle gas turbine 
(CCGT) power stations built in the UK during the 1990s, following the liberalisation 
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of the British power generation market  and of the ending of the European Union’s 
restriction on the use of gas for power generation (Helm 2003 p.167-69). 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of Power Project Financing Structure 
 
Project company
Power purchase agreement
Operation & 
maintenance contract
Fuel supply contract
Engineering, procurement & 
construction contract
Equity investor 1
Equity investor 2
Equity investor 3
Bank(s) and bond 
holders providing 
project finance
Flow of capital
Contractual agreement  
 
Source: Author 
 
The goal of the financing structure is to optimise the allocation of risk in such a way 
as to maximise the probability of the loans being repaid and serviced on time, 
consistent with an adequate equity return for the project investors. The banks (or bond 
holders) which provide the project finance loans need to be confident that the risks to 
the cashflows out of which their loan will be serviced are robust and that the key 
identifiable risks to those cashflows are clearly and legally enforceably allocated to 
parties that can bear them. 
 
The project company will therefore need to have the following main contracts in place 
before lending is feasible (Vinter 1998 ch.3). 
 
1. an engineering, procurement and construction contract 
2. a supply agreement (for fuel and other inputs) 
3. a sales contract (e.g. a power purchase agreement) 
4. an operating and maintenance contract. 
 
The engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract requires a separate 
company to undertake to build the station to a specific time and cost. Over-runs on 
either score are potentially very costly and the project company will seek clear 
indemnities against this risk, meaning the construction company will have to be 
creditworthy enough for such indemnities to be credible. The construction company 
will turn seek indemnities from the key equipment manufacturers. In the UK CCGT 
expansion of the 1990s, some new turbine designs had teething problems which led to 
commissioning delays and consequential damages being paid to the project company 
by the turbine manufacturer. 
 
EPRG No    1118                                                                                                                
8 
The supply agreement is a contract to cover the volume and price of the power 
station’s key operating inputs. For a CCGT this is essentially the gas supply. The 
economics of a CCGT boil down to the spread of the power price over the gas price 
(known as the “spark spread”) given a fixed efficiency of conversion through the 
turbine and a relatively small fixed cost of operations. The optimal risk position for 
the lending bank is that both prices are contractually fixed to provide a guaranteed 
profit margin for the length of the loan. Some degree of variation may be acceptable 
subject to a minimal likelihood of the revenue failing to cover the debt service cost. A 
typical take or pay contract for gas in the 1990s in the UK specified a minimum 
volume and a price index which allowed for some linkage to the oil price. This 
entailed some risk of a price mismatch and consequent losses but the banks were 
confident that the margin of error was large enough to protect their debt interest, the 
risk being therefore borne by the equity shareholders. 
 
The sales contract is a long term contract (typically 10-15 years) for a volume and 
price for the power. This contract provides the revenue out of which the project 
lending will be repaid. The banks will not want to take either volume or price risk, so 
a buyer for the power must be found. In the UK market of the 1990s, the project 
sponsors were typically regional electricity companies which had supply businesses 
enjoying an actual or de facto monopoly retail customer base. In a liberalised market 
however, the entity buying the power has no monopoly and takes the risk that it will 
be forced to pay for power that it can only sell at a loss. So the buyer will again need 
to be a creditworthy and probably large company to satisfy the banks that it will not 
renege. 
 
The last piece of the jigsaw is the operation and maintenance (O&M) contract. The 
plant must be run properly so that it can deliver the power specified under the sales 
agreement. The operator takes a fee for operating the plant and takes the risk that if it 
fails to deliver the power, other than because of a failure of the fuel supply, it is liable 
to pay compensation to the power buyer. 
 
If the contract is correctly specified and the various parties are creditworthy and 
competent, the project company has successfully laid off the various risks of the 
power project to the parties best able to bear them. The project financier can then be 
confident that it will be repaid and make the loan. Because the risks have been 
effectively allocated the residual equity risk should be quite low so a high level of 
leverage (ie debt to equity) is feasible, which means the overall cost of capital is 
minimised. 
 
But the residual risk is never zero. The remaining risks include (Sharma and Tanega 
2000. ch.2): 
 
1. counterparty risk: the danger that one or more of the contract counterparties 
ceases to be creditworthy 
2. political risk: the local or national government may intervene in the project in 
a damaging way 
3. legal and structural risk: the contracts are signed under a particular legal and 
fiscal framework that may be affected by later legislation which either 
invalidates them or more likely reduces the tax efficiency. 
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These risks are not merely theoretical, especially in emerging economies with less 
robust legal procedures. A key reason for the rapid loss of enthusiasm by US and 
European utilities for emerging market investments after the 1990s was the dismal 
record of contract enforcement and political interference in the power and water 
sector in Latin America and India in the 1990s (Lamech and Saeed May 2003; Annez 
November 2006). 
 
5. Nuclear power and project finance 
Conceptually there is no difference between a nuclear power project and a CCGT 
project. But there are important differences of scale and in the information needed to 
make the contracts feasible. 
 
Table 3 shows they key points of comparison between a CCGT and nuclear power 
plant. The most important difference at the time of writing is that project finance is all 
but impossible until there is a credible track record for the construction of new nuclear 
plants. The construction risk is by far the main economic risk because of the 
complexity of a nuclear power station and the truly dreadful history of construction 
delays and cost over-runs (Nuttall 2005 ch.1). The commissioning problems of new 
gas turbines in the UK CCGT boom were relatively small compared with the costs of 
nuclear construction over-runs. While delays can occur in any large construction 
project, banks are very unlikely to finance nuclear construction risk until there is some 
proven record of construction and sound operation. This record would need to be 
specific to each technology type so that for example it might take four or five separate 
EPRs (European Pressurised Water Reactors) to be built before lenders would be 
reasonably confident about the risk of future delays. A successful track record for one 
reactor type would be helpful for other types but very likely insufficient to achieve 
project lending until that type had established its own track record. 
 
The only way in which project lending might be feasible for the earliest NPP new 
build would be if some other party bears the construction risk. But in that case the risk 
is separated from the reward and it is unclear why any part would take on the main 
risk without a commensurate stake in the upside potential. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of CCGT and Nuclear Power for Project Finance 
 CCGT Nuclear Comment 
Approximate scale of 
capital investment ($m) 
150-750 5,000-7,000 CCGTs can be small, 
and are of low capital 
intensity 
Construction risk Well defined Not well defined owing 
to lack of recent track 
record 
Makes project finance 
impossible for early 
stations 
Technology risk Low for proven 
turbines; significant for 
newer designs 
Substantial for new 
designs until operating 
record built up 
Decays as operating 
hours rise; type specific 
Fuel supply contract Very important; terms 
available 
Less economically 
important but also a 
less liquid market 
Likely to be bundled 
with operations 
agreement 
Sales contract Very important Very important; scale 
makes multiple buyers 
likely 
Requires substantial 
retail supplier(s) with 
strong balance sheet 
Operating and Plenty of potential Very few potential  
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maintenance (O&M) 
contract 
operators operators; likely to be 
project sponsors 
Political risk Low Significant; high in 
some countries 
 
Regulatory risk Low Significant; high in 
some countries 
 
Source: Author 
 
The other points of difference between nuclear and CCGTs are as follows. 
 
1. The supply contract is proportionately much less important for an NPP. Whereas 
the cost of gas is around 60% of a CCGT’s operating costs and physical availability is 
very important because of the cost of storage or alternative fuel back up, for an NPP 
fuel is only about 7% of the cost and long inventories are feasible (MIT 2003 tables 
A-5.5.5 and A-5.5.6). Gas can be bought in a fairly liquid competitive market in the 
US and UK so in principle can be procured at short notice. By contrast, although 
uranium is relatively plentiful and can be procured in many different countries, the 
markets for fabricated uranium fuel are much more specialised. The cost of mined 
uranium makes up about one quarter of the total fuel price (World Nuclear 
Association 2010). The rest of the cost is the fuel enrichment and fabrication process, 
which is subject to much less competition and is more closely bound up with the 
operations of the plant. So it is likely that the fuel supply contract would be combined 
with the operations contract, with the operating company taking the whole risk on. In 
future, if the nuclear renaissance really happens on a large scale, hedging or otherwise 
protecting against uranium price or volume risk might become a more important 
feature of NPP investment. 
 
2. The operation and maintenance contract for a nuclear power plant is a much more 
important matter than for a gas plant because it is regulated more stringently. It is very 
likely that the sponsoring company would be the O&M contractor and that this would 
be a condition of achieving an operating licence from the nuclear regulator. 
 
3. Political risk is significantly higher for a nuclear plant because of the higher 
sensitivity that nuclear power has. Countries including Italy, Germany and Sweden 
have in the past elected governments that have decided to reverse their predecessors’ 
nuclear policy (Taylor 2007 ch.16). With nuclear stations having much longer lives 
than CCGTs the risk of a damaging change in policy is higher. 
 
The main reason is that an event that causes public concern at a nuclear power station 
in another country could cause a forced shutdown or closure in the home country, 
even if the technology and operating context were quite different. This “contagion” 
risk doesn’t apply to the same degree to other sorts of technology. But project finance 
has successfully been used in other projects with significant political and/or 
regulatory risk, for example the $3.2 billion Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan oil pipeline (Center 
for Civic Initiatives 2005). 
 
4. Regulatory risk is higher for an NPP but much of that risk can be dealt with before 
a project commits substantial capital. Indeed only if the regulatory approvals are 
certain would a project proceed. 
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We conclude that, once a particular reactor technology has proven that it has a reliable 
construction record – which of course could take many years if plants are build 
sequentially rather than in parallel – then there is no reason in principle why nuclear 
power should not attract project finance, eventually. 
6. Early build is different 
Section 4 argues that there is nothing unique about NPPs that rules out project 
finance, once the construction and operation of a particular reactor type is proven. But 
for a new type it will take a number of stations to be built and operated successfully 
for banks to have sufficient confidence in the project estimates that they will lend. 
 
The “first of a kind” problem is not unique to nuclear power. As noted above, some 
combined cycle gas turbine technologies in the 1990s experienced severe operating 
difficulties. That risk had to be borne ex ante by the equipment manufacturers and 
was the price those manufacturers paid for getting one or two successful operating 
units that could be used to showcase further sales. In principle an NPP equipment 
manufacturer could provide similar indemnities but that would still not take care of 
the construction risk, which was not typically a problem for the CCGTs, because they 
were relatively quick to build (less than two years) and their construction represented 
only a small evolution from other similar construction projects. By contrast the capital 
cost of an NPP is much more sensitive to construction delays and each reactor type 
has more idiosyncratic risk than a CCGT. The first ever EPR under construction at 
Olkiluoto in Finland is three years behind schedule and some 60% over budget 
(Hollinger 2010). 
 
The plant is being built under a turnkey fixed price contract, under which cost over-
runs should be borne by the manufacturer and contractor, Areva NP, which is 
majority owned by the company Areva, itself majority owned by the French 
government. One can question whether the NPP buyer would sign such a contract 
with any entity lacking the backing of either a very large, creditworthy company or a 
government. 
 
The second EPR, under construction at Flamanville in France, is also about 50% over 
budget and likely to be delayed by two years (EDF 2010). In this case the construction 
risk is being borne by EDF itself. 
Two further EPRs began construction in China in 2009 and 2010, for the state owned 
China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group, where they are reportedly on time and 
budget (Reuters 2011). Initial construction of two Westinghouse AP1000 reactors in 
China also appears to be on track, as are General Electric Advanced Boiling Water 
Reactors in China and Taiwan. With four units operating, three more under 
construction and several more planned, the ABWR is closest to establishing the track 
record needed for project financing (GE Energy website 2010). 
 
This implies there is no realistic way of getting banks to project finance NPPs until at 
least “a few” have been successfully built to time and cost, or the project sponsor is 
willing to provide guarantees that cover the risks of delay. It is likely to take at least 
three and probably four successful completions before project finance is available on 
commercially attractive terms. 
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The first few of a kind NPPs will therefore almost inevitably be financed on the 
general corporate balance sheet of large integrated electricity companies that have a 
substantial supply arm which will market the power produced. Some risk sharing may 
be feasible between the equipment manufacturer and construction company but it is 
unlikely that there would be any outside finance specifically for the project itself. 
 
Once a station is built and running successfully it would be possible to sell it to a 
project finance company, allowing the original sponsor to take a one off gain as 
compensation for the construction risk. 
 
The nearest to NPP project financing to the author’s knowledge was the now-
abandoned South Texas Project units 3 and 4. The proposed two new units were 
sponsored by the US utility company NRG Energy. The project was owned by a 
company Nuclear Innovation North America (NINA), which was majority owned by 
NRG and minority owned by a subsidiary of the Japanese corporation Toshiba, whose 
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor would have been used. NINA in turn signed 
procurement contracts (with Toshiba being part of the construction consortium too) 
and was intending to sign long term power purchase agreements that would have 
provided the backing for project finance and access to US government federal loan 
guarantees. NINA, critically, was “bankruptcy remote” to NRG (NRG Energy Inc. 
2011 p.20) In April 2011 NRG terminated its involvement in the project and wrote off 
the $331m equity it had invested in NINA, citing the Fukushima incident in Japan 
(NRG Energy Inc 2011).  
 
7. A nuclear project financing structure 
This section sketches a likely structure for a project financed NPP in the liberalised 
market context of the UK. The main change from the CCGT project structure shown 
in figure 2 is that a single project sponsor would probably be the main shareholder, 
the O&M contractor and the power purchaser. This company, which we’ll call DCE 
Power, would have to be a large, creditworthy company with a significant electricity 
supply business.  In the UK, EDF, RWE and E.ON all fall into this category as well as 
having nuclear operating experience (RWE and E.ON’s UK intended nuclear interests 
are held in a 50/50 joint venture company called Horizon Nuclear Power3). 
 
DCE Power would deal with the project company in three separate guises: 
1. the parent company would invest in the equity, taking a large though not 
necessarily majority share, so long as a shareholder agreement gave it veto 
over sales of the other shareholdings; 
2. DCE’s generating arm would sign the O&M contract; 
3. And DCE’s power supply arm would sign the power purchase agreement. 
 
Construction would be handled by a third party contractor, linked to the manufacturer, 
and would have to take most or all of the risk of cost over-runs and delays, to provide 
comfort to bank lenders. This third party would therefore need to be highly 
creditworthy, or receive guarantees from export credit agencies or similar state-
backed entities. 
 
                                                 
3 http://www.horizonnuclearpower.com/ 
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The financial credibility of this structure would depend on the project lender’s 
confidence in the creditworthiness of the overall DCE company to stand behind each 
of the agreements in the event of difficulties. A power purchase agreement in a 
competitive supply market involves a company committing to buy a commodity at a 
fixed price or index of prices, without any guarantee that it can sell the power 
profitably. A large and well capitalised supplier (which is the norm in Europe’s 
mostly oligopolistic and vertically integrated power markets) would reassure the 
project lenders that the contract would be honoured even if there periods when the 
market price of power fell below the price in the contract. 
 
DCE Power need not contract for all of the power from the NPP. It might well sign 
long term power contracts with other suppliers who want to include nuclear in their 
portfolio but don’t want any equity investment or operating involvement. These 
suppliers contract for a share of the power off-take from a new NPP without having 
any financial exposure to the operations or profitability of the plant. A range of 
European manufacturing companies with sites in France contracted in 2010 for 24 
year power contracts from EDF through a special purpose vehicle company called 
Exeltium.4 The Olkiluoto NPP under construction in Finland is backed by several 
long term power contracts with Finnish paper manufacturers. But the UK, among 
other countries, lacks a significant industrial demand for long term power, so any long 
term contract would need to be signed by the supplier itself, which would leave it 
partially exposed to price risk. 
8. Advantages of project financing NPPs 
There are two main benefits of using project finance in NPPs: 1) allowing a nuclear 
company to manage its risk while investing in several stations at once; and 2) an 
easier method for bringing in additional equity shareholders. 
 
As noted above, even very large utility companies like EDF would need to raise 
substantial new equity to fund a large programme of NPP construction. While this 
might be possible, shareholders might prefer that they offset some of the potential 
return in exchange for limiting the risk. EDF has many other potential investments to 
make and shareholders may prefer not to have an excessive amount of risk tied up in 
one concentrated area. 
 
A second benefit of setting up a separate project finance company is that it facilitates 
external equity shareholdings. As NPPs are large, physically indivisible units, there is 
a long history of multiple shareholdings, especially in the USA. Relatively small 
utilities which could not take on the ownership of a whole plant instead often sought 
to take a minority stake. Much of the consolidation of the 1990s took the form of 
reversing these multiple ownership stakes, which had often led to management 
conflicts and inefficiencies (World Nuclear Association 2010). 
 
Project finance makes multiple equity ownership easier because the management of 
the plant is explicitly contracted out. The shareholder agreement can allow for sale of 
the stakes without disrupting any of the contracts that affects the plant’s operations or 
financial stability. 
 
                                                 
4 http://www.linklaters.com/News/LatestDeals/2010/Pages/20100419.aspx 
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The growth of infrastructure funds and sovereign wealth funds, alongside the pension 
funds that are traditional owners of long term assets, means there is a potentially large 
pool of equity finance available for NPPs, so long as investor can diversify their 
country and reactor type risk. This is possible in principle through conventional joint 
ventures but would be easier and more flexible, potentially allowing a liquid 
secondary market in investments, through project finance structures. 
 
More generally, with NPPs being of a scale similar to the large capital intensive 
investments shown in table 2 above, ruling out the use of project finance would risk 
limiting the scope of NPP expansion. Infrastructure spending more broadly is widely 
expected to grow substantially in the next twenty years, owing to economic growth in 
low and middle income countries and a need for replacement of ageing infrastructure 
in high income countries. One study seems a more than doubling of real infrastructure 
spending globally (McKinsey Global Institute 2010). For the US, one (possibly not 
disinterested) source sees a need for $2.2 trillion of infrastructure spending in the next 
five years (American Association of Civil Engineers 2011). NPPs, at best, are one 
form of this broader infrastructure capital spending. Unless they can become seen as 
“normal” they are likely to face higher capital costs than other, competing 
investments. 
 
9. Practitioner views 
The author conducted loosely structured interviews with six representatives of major 
project finance banks and two specialist energy finance investment banks in 2010 (so 
before the Japanese earthquake and tsunami of early 2011. The questions are shown in 
the appendix. While this is statistically a tiny sample, the banks concerned represent 
over a quarter of the global project finance business. 
 
The overall conclusions were very consistent. First, all banks are open to nuclear-
related lending and in most cases already have some exposure. They see a major new 
business opportunity potentially opening up if NPP construction booms globally and 
are keen not to miss out. But few have a large team of people in place as the 
opportunity is still some years away. 
 
Second, there is very little that is special about nuclear in principle.. The practitioners 
see nuclear as a somewhat extreme case (capital intensity, technical complexity) of a 
spectrum. They would apply similar underlying lending criteria and structures to those 
used in other lending decisions. They are more concerned about managing the 
commercial or market risk in liberalised power markets than in the generation source 
itself. The financial damage done by the electricity price collapse in the UK in 2001-
2002 (Taylor 2007 ch.10) ch.10) has scarred the power finance sector for some time. 
 
Third, nuclear is different in principle in so far as it still represents an unusually sensitive 
public policy issue. As one banker put it, “We don’t want people protesting outside our 
offices”. This translates into not wanting to lend unless nuclear is felt to command public 
consent or support. Non-nuclear energy investments are potentially as controversial or more 
so than nuclear, as shown by the protests against wind-farms, additional transmission lines to 
service wind-farms and against plans for a new coal power station at Kingsnorth in Kent, UK 
(Harvey 2009).  
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Fourth, the main practical objection to lending against new nuclear stations is the 
construction risk. This is always the highest risk part of a project finance venture but 
the industry’s very poor track record, reinforced by the problems of the EPR, make it 
impossible to envisage project financing at the construction phase for some time. The 
banks were mostly European and highly aware of the EPR experience. A few cited the 
far better construction record in South Korea, Japan and China as evidence that NPPs 
may be bankable sooner. Nearly all bankers saw early potential for using project 
finance for NPPs once they were fully built and operational, so long as the reactor 
type had some operating record. This, so-called phased financing model is reportedly 
being considered for NPPs in China (Borovas, Mauel et al. 2010). 
 
Fifth, both bankers and advisers saw the potential for a large new market in both 
equity finance and bond finance for NPPs. Equity finance could come from the “new” 
investors such as infrastructure funds and sovereign wealth funds. Bond finance could 
come from existing bond investors seeking a wider range of investment opportunities, 
especially in the long term (10 years and more) part of the market. This market might 
need some “leadership” from quasi-state lenders such as the World Bank or European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development to get going but NPPs are a potentially 
attractive new sub-asset class. 
 
10. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that any substantial wave of investment in NPPs will need 
access to project finance, as other large capital intensive projects do. It argues that 
there is no intrinsic barrier to project finance for nuclear but that banks will only lend 
after the industry has built a successful track record of construction. The advantages 
of project finance are a lower overall cost of capital and a superior allocation of risks 
among interested parties. Without project finance, investment will be limited to very 
large, well capitalised power companies and these will probably build fewer new 
plants than they would if project finance were available. NPP investment would be 
disadvantaged in competition with a likely boom in other forms of infrastructure 
investment. Interviews by the author (before the Fukushima disaster) with a number 
of project finance lenders and investment banks confirm that there is no nuclear-
specific reason for project finance to be denied to NPPs. 
 
Appendix.  Questions put in interviews 
1. Would your bank ever lend to a company in the nuclear sector? 
2. Do you see nuclear power stations having any distinctive features compared with 
other types of asset from a credit point of view? 
3. Does your bank have any nuclear-specific policy, distinct from other credit 
policies? 
4. Do you believe that new nuclear plants could be project financed and if so when? 
5. Do you believe that existing or post-construction new nuclear power plants could 
be project financed, and if so when? 
6. Where do you see potential sources of third party equity investment in project 
finance companies investing in nuclear power? 
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